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Abstract: While the phenomenon described in this article may
appear to be an African problem, the Western world's increasing
involvement in fighting terrorists make it one that America's military forces might encounter. Unfortunately, it could add a significant
layer of complexity to US operations as American troops attempt
to differentiate allies from enemies. In Africa, sometimes they are
one and the same.

S

obel, a portmanteau of “soldier” and “rebel,” appears to have
been coined in Sierra Leone during the 1990s. This was a
period marked in parts of West Africa by fighting over conflict
diamonds, also known as blood diamonds, when government soldiers
discovered how lucrative it could be to serve as “soldiers by day, rebels by
night” or, as the villagers called them, “sobels.” On closer examination, it
can be observed that the relationship between the soldiers of the Sierra
Leonean Army and the Revolutionary United Front (RUF), the rebel
group which during the country’s civil war occupied large portions of
diamond-rich land, changed over time, thus making the sobel phenomenon more like the sobel phenomena.
Unfortunately, the presence of sobels is often an indication that
a war is profitable for both rebels and soldiers, providing them with
an incentive to lengthen the conflict to maximize their earnings. With
neither side able to score a decisive win, both sides profit. Meanwhile,
the rural population, essentially held hostage during the conflict, is often
terrorized so as not to intervene. As an example, the RUF started not
only to amputate people’s hands, but to publicize such mutilations as a way
of preventing people from casting ballots and putting a political end to
“unpolitical” brutalities.
Though Sierra Leone appears to be where the “sobel” neologism
originated, variations of the soldier-by-day, rebel-by-night phenomenon
can be found in many parts of Africa (and, indeed, in other parts of the
world). By studying the sobel phenomenon and its variations, it is possible to determine what factors influence government soldiers to join rebel
forces, ways to dissuade them from joining, and, if they do join, possible
ways to induce them to return permanently to government service.
While the sobel phenomenon described within these pages may
appear to be an African problem, the Western world’s increasing involvement in fighting terrorists on that continent make it one America’s
military forces might encounter. Unfortunately, it could add a significant
layer of complexity to US operations as American troops attempt to
differentiate allies from enemies. In Africa, sometimes they are one and
the same.
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Background to Sobel: The Sierra Leone Civil War

Sierra Leone’s civil war started in 1991, when the RUF, led by Foday
Sankoh, and backed by Liberian warlord Charles Taylor, launched an
attack in a diamond-rich area in Eastern Sierra Leone.1 Though ostensibly the RUF’s raison d’être was to oppose the corrupt government, it
morphed more into a group of bandits and less a band of revolutionaries.
As for Taylor, who later would become President of Liberia, his interests
from the outset appear mostly financial.
The war lasted eleven years, during which time both the RUF and
the army were responsible for heinous atrocities against civilian populations. Estimates of the number killed range upwards of 50,000.2 It took
foreign intervention, in particular the country’s former colonial power,
the British, to help end the war.

Atrocities as a Contributing Factor

There were many factors which led to some of Sierra Leone’s soldiers becoming sobels, including several socioeconomic ones discussed
later. A significant driving force, however, was the civilian hatred of
the army because of the atrocities the soldiers committed fighting the
RUF. The soldiers, when willing to hunt down the RUF—an inconsistent process as the army was sometimes afraid of direct combat with
the rebels—often had difficulties locating their enemy. Frustrated, they
would brutalize citizens suspected of being RUF members or sympathizers. Additionally, when the army would recapture a town, it would
sometimes relocate the population in a program reminiscent of the
hated “strategic hamlet” initiative of the Vietnam War.
The soldiers’ actions generated a great deal of hatred on the part
of the mistreated people; some even joined the RUF. Being hated by
the civilian populace caused the already low morale among the soldiers
to sink even further. Eventually this low morale, combined with low
government rations, convinced the soldiers that instead of fighting the
villagers—who fought back at their mistreatment—it was more lucrative to join the rebels in looting civilian populace.3

Socio-Economic Factors

Particularly interesting with regards to the sobel phenomenon in
Sierra Leone were the socioeconomic differences between the initial
rebel recruits and the army recruits: there were none. Both the RUF
and army “recruited from the same social stratum, the underprivileged
youth of Freetown, who had often gone to the same schools with no job
prospects, and shared the same revolt.”4 This shared background and
these common ties likely made it more difficult for the soldiers to view
the rebels as true enemies. Combined with poor training, poor pay, and
1     Lansana Gberie, A Dirty War in West Africa: the RUF and the Destruction of Sierra Leone
(Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2005), 6.
2     “Sierra Leone,” GlobalSecurity.org, 26 Apr 2012, http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/world/
war/sierra_leone.htm
3     Lansana Gberie, A Dirty War in West Africa, 102.
4     Michel Ben Arrous and Robert Feldman, “Understanding Contemporary Conflicts in Africa: A
State of Affairs and Current Knowledge,” Unpublished Manuscript, January 2013.
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little esprit de corps, there was no mental barrier to breach for the soldiers
to see themselves as helping or becoming rebels.
The Sierra Leone experience demonstrates the difficulties inherent
in quelling a rebellion with soldiers cut from the same cloth as rebels.
Often, opposing forces try to demonize or dehumanize the other side,
perhaps making it psychologically easier to kill. It is difficult for soldiers,
however, to dehumanize the enemy when as youngsters they lived and
played together.
To be sure, not all African nations have armies composed of people
from the same location and socioeconomic background as rebel groups.
In instances where they are different, and frequently that difference is
ethnicity, the opposing forces appear more likely not only to fight but to
brutalize each other. Press reports from Africa are filled with stories of
human rights abuses, including descriptions of activities bordering on,
or maybe even crossing into, ethnic cleansing by soldiers and rebels alike.
One must remember that Sierra Leone soldiers were not defending
their families from attack. The military mission was far from home, so
there was no added sense that failure to destroy the RUF would be personally disastrous. For that matter, there was also no sense that joining
the rebels, even temporarily, would endanger families back home. If
anything, the converse was probably true: joining the rebels was a way
for the soldiers to enrich themselves and, in turn, their families.
Finally, with regards to the socioeconomic factors leading to the
sobel phenomenon, one must remember the long tradition in many
African countries of both rebels and governments recruiting, voluntarily
or forcibly, children into their ranks. These young rebels and soldiers,
who are still quite impressionable, easily swayed by peer pressure, and
usually followers rather than leaders, can readily and perhaps even
effortlessly switch sides when those around them are doing so.

Evolution of the Sobel

It is difficult, if not impossible, to ascertain the exact date sobels
first emerged in Sierra Leone. But certainly by 1993 government soldiers
had begun their ruse of dressing as RUF fighters at night and attacking
villages. As these nocturnal soldiers-turned-rebels retreated, they would
leave weapons and ammunition for the “real” RUF rebels who, in turn,
would also terrorize and pillage the villages. With daybreak, the army,
now in uniform, would appear, offering protection from the rebels . . .
for a price. Eventually, the army developed ways to supply the rebels even
during daylight, such as prearranging a rebel ambush and losing a truck
laden with military equipment.
Sobels and real rebels coordinated attacks to avoid fighting each
other. Finding an isolated village, they would take turns terrorizing and
pillaging it, ensuring both were not there at the same time and avoiding
the possibility they would accidentally come to blows.
Adding to the confusion of who attacked a village—soldiers or
rebels—were rebels who conducted raids in stolen army uniforms.5
Thus, it worked both ways: actual soldiers dressing as rebels at night
5     “Revolutionary United Front,” GlobalSecurity.org, http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/
world/para/ruf.htm
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(the sobels), and actual rebels dressing as soldiers. Poor communications
from the region, in conjunction with a lack of independent confirmation, probably did little to help clarify which group, soldiers or rebels,
actually carried out an attack.
The sobels, during these and other attacks, were particularly brutal.
From a philosophical standpoint, perhaps this fact can be attributed
to the ideological void left by the exhaustion of grand narratives such
as nationalism, pan-Africanism, African socialism, and others. Lacking
both the analytical tools to understand their own underprivileged status
and a coherent agenda to redress it, they were more prone to extreme
levels of brutality than a soldier or a rebel clearly standing on either side.
In this regard, the sobel phenomenon could also be read as a product of
current ideological disenchantment.

Sobels and Sierra Leone’s Military Junta

Sierra Leone’s ruling military junta, the National Provisional Ruling
Committee (NRPC) ironically benefitted, at least initially, from these
soldiers who would betray their government and periodically join the
rebels. The junta explained they were anxious for a return to democracy, but could not relinquish power until the RUF was defeated and the
country was at peace. Such proclamations created the appearance that
the NRPC had the country’s—as opposed to their own—interests at
heart. However, like many juntas, once in power their desire was to stay
in power. The troops, by failing to defeat the RUF and increasing the
number of RUF rebels by periodically and clandestinely becoming rebels
themselves, created enough concern that the NRPC declared it was not
yet safe for a return to civilian rule.
Having soldiers periodically join the rebels and share in their profitable ventures had another benefit for the military officials. As happens
in many African militaries, conditions in the field for lower-ranking
troops can be miserable. Irregular and meager pay contributed to the
conditions for mutiny against superior officers. By allowing these soldiers to join the rebels, mutinies and perhaps even coups were avoided.
Eventually the sobel phenomenon was exposed, and the NRPC,
under pressure, admitted that at least 20 percent of the government
troops were disloyal.6 The exact percentage is unknown, but, given the
economic incentives to share in the rebels’ profits, the lack of oversight
from the military junta (who benefitted from the sobel phenomenon),
and the familiarity of troops with the rebels (since they had both come
from the same social stratum), it would not be surprising if the percentage of troops serving as rebels was much higher than the 20 percent
claimed by the NRPC.
Knowing a percentage of his troops were disloyal, and realizing his
military was incapable of securing the diamond areas from the RUF, Sierra
Leone President Captain Valentine Strasser turned to a private military
company, Gurkha Security Groups, for help in 1995.7 Largely comprised
of Nepalese ex-British army troops, they were led by an American, Robert
6     Lansana Gberie, “The May 25 Coup d’Etat in Sierra Leone: A Militariat Revolt?” African
Development 23 (3-4): 149-70.
7     Simon Akam, “The Vagabond King,” New Statesman, February 2, 2012, http://www.
newstatesman.com/africa/2012/01/sierra-leone-strasser-war
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MacKenzie. Unfortunately, MacKenzie, along with Strasser’s aide-decamp, Abu Tarawalli, were ambushed and killed. Strasser then turned to
a South African-based private military company, Executive Outcomes,
whose success in combating the rebels is described below.

From Rebels to Soldiers to Rebels

While not quite the sobel description of soldier by day and rebel by
night, a related phenomenon is apparent in several other parts of Africa.
Former rebels integrate into government armies and then revert to rebels
at a later date. An excellent example can be found when examining the
recent history of the Tuareg, a traditionally nomadic people who live
in the Sahara and northern Sahel of Mali and Niger. There have been
several Tuareg insurgencies, detailed descriptions of which are beyond
the scope of this article; however, these conflicts were often over issues
such as the Tuareg feeling slighted by central governments regarding
sharing of wealth from minerals mined in Tuareg regions. Peace treaties
to end these rebellions often included an agreement to integrate the
former rebels into government militaries. However, sometimes these
rebels-turned-soldiers became disenchanted with the army or the way
fellow Tuareg were treated, resulting in many deserting the military and
returning to being rebels.8
This Tuareg changeover between rebel and soldier contains elements
of the sobel phenomenon: the possibility exists that whatever state—rebel
or soldier—the Tuareg or the Sierra Leoneans are in, they are capable of
changing; that change can be relatively easy, and when the change occurs,
it is frequently removed from oversight by the central government.
Clearly there are also some differences between the sobel phenomenon and the Tuareg rebel-soldier-rebel changeover: while the sobels
change daily, the Tuareg rebel-soldier-rebel transition can be measured
in months. Another difference is the Sierra Leoneans continue to cycle
between soldier and rebel, whereas the Tuareg seemingly stopped at
rebel, though this might yet change again if there is another attempt
to bring more Tuareg into the army. However, these and other differences should not obscure the most noteworthy similarity: both can leave
governments and foreign analysts guessing as to the true strength and
loyalties of the rebels and military forces.
Adding to the confusion of estimating the strength of various forces
is the contradictory nature of information regarding rebels and soldiers
who switch. An infamous but uncorroborated claim of Tuareg defections from the army occurred during one of the Tuareg rebellions.9 The
Mouvement des Nigériens Pour la Justice (the Nigeriens Movement for Justice
or MNJ), a mostly Tuareg-based group in northern Niger fighting for
greater revenue sharing from uranium mining, claimed an entire special
forces unit, the Niger Rapid Intervention Company, which had been
trained by the American military, defected in 2007. The government,
though acknowledging some desertions, denied they had occurred en
masse. Other unsubstantiated claims have also been made regarding this
8     “Tuareg Rebels Leave Mali Town,” BBC News, May 24, 2006, http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/
africa/5008224.stm
9     “NIGER: Five Killed as Army Clashes with Tuaregs in Desert North, “ IRIN News as carried by
GlobalSecurity.Org, October 7, 2004, http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/library/news/2004/10/
mil-041007-irin02.htm

72

Parameters 43(4) Winter 2013-14

unit. Such claims and counterclaims in regions where it is hard to document the truth underscore the difficulties in assessing the magnitude of
“soldier by day, rebel by night” and related phenomena.

Private Military Companies as a Possible Solution

One suggestion to avoid risking soldiers becoming rebels is to
outsource the army; in other words, hire private contractors to provide
security. Indeed, there have been some successes with private military
companies, perhaps the most notable one in Africa with the aforementioned Executive Outcomes, which successfully wrested control of the
diamond fields from the RUF in the mid-1990s, eventually forcing a
negotiated peace between the rebel organization and the government.
Further evidence of the superiority of private military companies to at
least some African peacekeeping forces was provided when Executive
Outcomes, under international pressure, was compelled to leave.10
Unfortunately, it was replaced by an ineffective United Nations (UN)
peacekeeping force; the RUF soon returned with a vengeance, implementing Operation No Living Thing, aptly named, as many were
mutilated or killed in a butchering spree that reached all the way to the
capital, Freetown.11
As evidenced by the pressure on Sierra Leone to stop using Executive
Outcomes, there is substantial animosity by African leaders and governments against the employment of private military companies. Several
reasons for this animosity are as follows:
•• The embarrassment that African militaries are incapable of handling
internal security issues.
•• The appearance of neocolonialism if troops from another country, even
if the other country is African, are brought in. Executive Outcomes
may call themselves a private military company, but to many Africans
they are mercenaries, and Africa’s long and bitter history with mercenaries—especially white mercenaries—used by colonial powers is not
forgotten.
•• The potential loss of income to African militaries because the UN pays
governments to supply peacekeepers. By not allowing private military
companies, the UN is essentially forced to use African militaries, providing a lucrative source of revenue for those countries which furnish
the troops.
•• The concern that mercenaries are not bound by the laws of states as
private military companies fall outside the normal chain of command.
They could be used as a tool against political opponents and may “fight
in a non-regulated, wanton fashion.”12
•• The belief that employing private military companies dissociates the
technical aspects of security from the legitimacy, or lack thereof, of
the government. As a result, such companies are unable to provide
10     Simon Akam, “The Vagabond King.”
11     Catherine Hawley, “A Country Torn by Violence,” BBC News, January 12, 1999, http://news.
bbc.co.uk/2/hi/special_report/1999/01/99/sierra_leone/251377.stm
12     Mayank Bubna, “The Case for Mercenaries in Africa,” Institute for Defense Studies and Analysis,
June 1998 http://www.idsa.in/system/files/IB_MercenariesinAfrica.pdf
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long-term solutions to problems required by a political process.
Despite the concerns and protestations of some African leaders
regarding the use of private military companies, there are others who
call not only for their use but also for their compensation based on
outcomes. There are also those in the middle, looking at security needs
in various regions but unsure if private military companies should fill
them. This tenuous outlook is perhaps best exemplified in a statement by
former UN Secretary General Kofi Annan regarding the Rwanda genocide during the time he was head of the UN Department of Peacekeeping
Operations: “When we had need of skilled soldiers to separate fighters
from refugees in the Rwandan refugee camps in Goma, I even considered the possibility of engaging a private firm. But the world may not be
ready to privatize peace.”13

Conclusion

There appears to be a tradeoff with regards to recruiting soldiers
from the same location and social stratum as where the rebels recruit.
In this situation, the soldiers generally appear to be less likely to commit
atrocities against the rebels. The tradeoff is the soldiers are likely to
be less effective at putting down the rebellion and, in fact, may even
serve as part-time rebels themselves. The converse also appears true.
While having soldiers who are significantly different from the rebels
enhances the likelihood they will actually engage them in combat, it
increases the risks for the commission of atrocities—on both sides—
during the fighting. Certainly there are exceptions. Depending on the
location, additional factors may alter these generalizations; however,
those who have spent time in Africa can attest to both the close ties
within ethnic groups and the frequent animosity among ethnic groups.
In Sierra Leone the soldiers joined the rebels; in some African countries
the soldiers massacre the rebels.
Perhaps the step an African nation can take which would have the
greatest impact on preventing soldiers from serving with the rebels is
for the government to get its own house in order. Corruption is contagious, and it is probably unreasonable to ask soldiers to risk their
lives for a few dollars a month while officials, far removed from the
fighting, live in splendor. Additionally, by having a legitimate and at
least minimally effective government, one that appears to be trying to
make a better life for its citizens, soldiers may feel more committed to
serving the nation honorably.
Related to the government being effective is the need for it to be
competent when it sets domestic and foreign policy objectives. Irrational
objectives which antagonize ethnic groups within the country or governments of neighboring countries, or which dedicate disproportionate
amounts of money to projects of questionable benefit, or any of the other
untold numbers of dubious policies, are often an obstacle to developing
a sense of nationalism. Having rational policy objectives will help obtain
commitment from soldiers who see benefits to the citizens.
Unfortunately, there are numerous African governments which
are largely corrupt, grossly ineffective, or both. It is hard to be cynical
13     Kofi Annan, “Thirty-Fifth Annual Ditchley Foundation Lecture,” UN Press Release SG/
SM/6613, 26 June 1998.
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about soldiers who decide to moonlight as rebels when the government
is enriching itself at the expense of the people or directing that only
certain groups, inevitably tied to the politicians in office, benefit handsomely from government largesse while others receive nothing.
African nations can take several actions to minimize the likelihood
their troops will become sobels. These include:
•• Improving pay for troops so there is less incentive to supplement their
income.
•• Improving training for troops so there is a greater sense of professionalism. Especially important in this training is an emphasis on human
rights. As stated earlier, one of the reasons soldiers became rebels was
because they were already battling the villagers whom they had abused.
•• Developing and enforcing regulations against children serving as
soldiers.
•• Improving command and control of African troops.
•• Setting clear expectation of military objectives in operations against
rebels, and, along these lines, clear rules of engagement.
•• Utilizing private military companies, at least in part, for operations
where there might be strong incentives, such as in diamond-rich areas,
for soldiers to become sobels. This measure does not guarantee private
military company mercenaries will not illegally enrich themselves, but
often these companies have better control over their employees than
African militaries do over their troops.
•• Stating clearly soldiers are prohibited from serving with the rebels
and offering strong, though humane, punishments for those who do.
The reader might note that foreign military assistance could be
valuable in helping African nations implement some of these suggested
courses of action. United States Africa Command (AFRICOM) could
take a role in improving command and control, raising the quality of
training, and assisting in the development of clear military objectives.
An additional, though significantly more controversial, action would be
the use of unmanned aerial vehicles, drones, to monitor African troops
to ensure they perform in a professional manner. These initiatives could
make a tremendous difference, relatively inexpensively, with a small footprint on the ground and not in combat. Of course, an AFRICOM venture
is not risk free . . . adverse outcomes are definitely a possibility. The
potential benefits that would accrue from the cessation of a percentage of
African soldiers in certain countries not engaging in rebel-like activities
need to be weighed against potential costs—including the possibility of
American deaths—of US involvement, even if limited to advising.
When discussing whether to utilize AFRICOM, one must remember that benefits from such a venture would accrue not just to African
countries but to other nations as well, including the United States.
America, especially in helping to decrease abuses by African soldiers,
could improve its image not just in African countries with important
mineral resources but throughout much of the continent. Additionally,
more professional African militaries could mean more stable countries,
resulting in better investment opportunities for American companies
previously hesitant to enter certain regions because of dangers involved.
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The existence of stable African coastal nations decreases the likelihood
of pirates launching from their shores and interfering with international
shipping. Such benefits, while appealing, are only potential, and unanticipated consequences to interventions are always a possibility, a problem
amplified by the vagaries of African ethnic and political rivalries.
Though some actions to turn the sobel phenomenon around may
be fairly easy to implement, such as providing clear rules of engagement, others, such as improving a nation’s governance, are far more
difficult. Therefore, in the long run, expect the sobel phenomenon and
its variants to continue, making it difficult at times for American military operations to distinguish allies from enemies. As stated earlier, in
Africa sometimes they are one and the same.
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